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ABSTRACT
This study investigates human error associated with 599 Naval Aviation
maintenance-related mishaps (MRMs) in Fiscal Years 90-99. The Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME) taxonomy was
utilized to classify contributory human errors within a robust theoretical framework.
Variable Poisson process models are developed to predict MRMs and relationships
between the error dimensions are investigated. The results of this study show that the
HFACS-ME taxonomy provides an adequate framework for the classification of MRM
causal factors; that variable Poisson process models are suitable for predicting future
mishaps; and that there are significant relationships between selected causal dimensions,
sufficient to warrant further investigation. These results provide information regarding
the predicted impact of MRMs on future operational readiness and mission capability.
Through being aware of these aspects, decision-makers are armed with the knowledge to
make better decisions concerning the preservation and allocation of the resources at their
disposal.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Budgetary constraints imposed upon the US military are particularly burdensome
as they are being imposed while demands for aspects such as mission capability, adequate
training and operational readiness are being maintained. Throughout the military, leaders
are looking at their operations and critically evaluating the applicability, cost, utility, and
value of their functions. A closer self-examination by Naval Aviation has revealed
potential asset preservation and associated cost savings through the reduction of
avoidable human errors that contribute to mishaps.
Advances in technology and reliability, combined with numerous intervention
strategies, have effectively targeted materiel reliability to the extent that the number of
mishaps related to mechanical failure has declined at a greater rate than those tied to
human error. Nearly all Naval Aviation mishaps involve some form of human error,
predominately aircrew or maintainer error, yet the reporting system does not support the
systematic inclusion of data at the time of the investigation that pertains to a theoretical
human error framework. Many studies offer theoretical models that focus on aircrew-
related error, leaving maintenance as the much maligned "stepchild," often criticized, but
seldom offered assistance in addressing its failings. In an attempt to address this, a
"Maintenance Extension" for the Naval Safety Center's Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS-ME) taxonomy was developed. The HFACS-ME model,
which focuses on causation factors particular to the maintenance environment, is based
upon current organizational and psychological theories of human error. It views a
maintainer' s performance as being influenced by a series of latent conditions
xv
(supervisory, maintainer. and working conditions) that can lead to an unsafe maintainer
act, which in turn can lead to a mishap, ground damage, injury, or unsafe maintenance
condition.
The purpose of this study is to investigate human errors in Naval Aviation
maintenance-related mishaps (MRMs) by conducting a human factors analysis to predict
the occurrence of future MRMs and to analyze trends in causal factors. There are two
objectives: The first is to validate previously developed models that attempted to predict
future mishaps as a stochastic model with a variable Poisson arrival process. Secondly, a
data analysis will be conducted on the mishap data of the past ten years to determine if
there are significant trends or relationships within the factors attributed to MRMs.
The results of this study show that the HFACS-ME taxonomy provides an
adequate framework for the classification of MRM causal factors. Additionally, through
the validation of the previously developed stochastic models, it was confirmed that the
variable Poisson process model provides a satisfactorily robust, yet straightforward model
for predicting the number of future mishaps. The trend analysis of the causal factors of
MRMs revealed that there is a significant relationship between the causal dimensions of
Squadron Supervisory Conditions (SQN) and Maintainer Violation (VIO), enough to
warrant the suggestion that the correlation of these aspects be further investigated.
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The United States has been at the forefront of a worldwide economic boom that
has seen unparalleled prosperity in the last decade of the 20 1 century (Svensson, 1999).
Despite this, US Government agencies are still finding themselves subject to sustained
requirements to become efficient business-like entities. The US military is not exempt
from these efficiency measures and accordingly, budgetary constraints are still very much
in evidence, causing military decision-makers to search for potential asset preservation
and associated cost savings (Lockhardt, 1997). These budgetary constraints are
particularly burdensome as they are being imposed while demands for aspects such as
adequate training and operational readiness are being maintained. Throughout the
military, managers are looking at their operations and critically evaluating the
applicability, cost, utility and value of their functions. The low-hanging fruit— the areas
with the most tangible benefits — has long since been harvested and attention is now
being focused on less easily defined and more intangible costs (Lauber, 2000).
In accordance with operational and budgetary demands, a closer self-examination
by Naval Aviation has revealed potential asset preservation and associated cost savings
through the reduction of avoidable human errors that contribute to mishaps (Nutwell &
Sherman, 1997). To achieve this, Naval Aviation must identify the types of human error
associated with mishaps, and then implement intervention programs and strategies aimed
at reducing the causes of these errors (Shappell & Weigmann, 1997). This study will take
another step toward that goal. It will identify particular categories of human error
associated with past mishaps and then develop mathematical models and investigate
potential trends relating to these errors. This evaluation should provide the most likely
impact a program of focused error reduction might have.
B. BACKGROUND
Compared to other means of transportation, aviation is relatively new - it has yet
to reach its 100th anniversary. Another factor that sets it apart from other forms of
transportation is in the different culture that it has developed. Aviation has fostered an
extensive safety-oriented culture where the checks and balances in place far outweigh
those in most similar transport-related industries (Johnson, 1993). Additionally, the
extent to which aviation accidents are investigated is far greater than those of ground-
based transportation, with the findings of these accident investigations typically focused
on preventing similar mishaps. In the past, most mishap reduction efforts have been
directed at reducing or eliminating mechanical failure (Weigmann & Shappell, 1997).
These efforts have made air travel - the safest mode of transportation (in terms of
fatalities per passenger mile) - even safer (Parker, 1992).
In the past twenty years advances in technology and reliability, combined with
numerous intervention strategies, have contributed to an overall decline in the number of
Naval Aviation Class A flight mishaps (Dirren. 2000) - the most serious accident
category (see Figure 1). The majority of strategies effectively targeted materiel reliability
to the extent that the number of accidents related to mechanical failure has declined at a
far greater rate than those pertaining to human error (Reason, 1997a). Accordingly, the
proportion of mishaps attributable to human error has increased and become a more
visible target for reduction strategies. The National Transportation Safety Board has
taken this fact seriously, and in conjunction with the Federal Aviation Administration,
has implemented many programs to address human error (Goglia, 2000). The majority of
these programs are comparatively in their infancy and address aspects such as personnel
attitudes and interpersonal communication.
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Figure 1. Naval Aviation Safety Initiatives (Naval Safety Center, 1999).
Nearly all aviation accidents involve some form of human error (Weigmann &
Shappell, 1997), yet the predominance of accident reporting systems do not support the
inclusion of data that pertains to any theoretical human error framework (Bruggink,
1996). While many experts believe human nature dictates that it is impossible to
eliminate all human errors (Gertman & Blackman, 1994), there is more than enough
latitude in the aviation industry for human errors to be reduced and benefits realized.
Within the field of aviation there are three prevalent categories of human error present:
supervisory, aircrew, and maintainer. A number of studies (Shappell & Wiegmann,
1997; Trollip & Jensen, 1991; Wickens, 1997) have offered theoretical models that have
focused on aircrew-related error, leaving maintenance and its supervision as the much
maligned "stepchild," often criticized, but seldom offered assistance in addressing its
failings (Marx & Graeber, 1994). There have been various piecemeal attempts to address
maintenance error; however, there has not been a coordinated approach grounded in the
theoretical framework of accident causation (Marx, 1998). It is through such a theoretical
framework that steps can be taken to avoid further occurrences of the same type of
accident (Marx & Graeber, 1994). Should a framework be identified, a post hoc analysis
of previous mishaps would be required first to determine the validity and reliability of the
framework, and second, to enable the data to be analyzed from a maintenance
perspective. In the event of the framework being successful in analyzing maintenance-
related incident data, such a framework could be incorporated into existing mishap
investigation procedures.
In response to the heightened awareness of human factors as a contributing
element to a significant percentage of mishaps. Naval Aviation established a Human
Factors Quality Management Board in 1996. The board's purpose was to analyze and
improve the processes, programs and systems that impact human performance in Naval
Aviation (Nutwell & Sherman, 1997). In addition to this, recent developments by the
Naval Safety Center (NSC) in analyzing human errors contributing to Naval Aviation
mishaps have resulted in the development of the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS) taxonomy (Frazier, 1999). The HFACS taxonomy draws
upon concepts from various accident causation theories and aims to target areas for
intervention by adequately representing factors that are precursors to accidents.
A "Maintenance Extension" of the original HFACS taxonomy, focusing on
causation factors particular to the maintenance environment (Schmidt, Schmorrow &
Hardee, 1997), was developed in order to classify factors that lead to maintenance-related
mishaps (MRMs). The HFACS-ME model is based upon the original HFACS taxonomy
as well as on current organizational and psychological theories of human error. HFACS-
ME views a maintained s performance as being influenced by a series of latent conditions
(supervisory, maintainer, and working conditions) that can lead to an unsafe maintainer
act, which in turn can lead to a mishap, ground damage, injury, or unsafe maintenance
condition. Naval Aviation MRMs did not lend themselves to human factors analysis in
their original form, and to overcome this situation, a post hoc analysis of contributing
factors was conducted by two Naval Officers, well versed in the HFACS-ME taxonomy
and experienced in maintenance operations. The two judges independently reviewed
each MRM case, and a high level of agreement was achieved in coding of the MRMs.
This result was an encouraging baseline that suggested not only that the mishaps were
correctly coded, but that the HFACS-ME taxonomy appeared to be a sufficient tool for
mishap data analysis.
Another significant work that incorporated the HFACS-ME taxonomy entailed the
analysis of 470 Naval Aviation MRMs (Schmorrow, 1998). The analysis encompassed
the mathematical modeling of the errors and used the models to (a) predict the frequency
with which maintenance-based mishaps will occur in the future and (b) approximate the
potential cost savings from the reduction of each error type. It showed the utility of such
an analysis in estimating potential return on investment of proposed intervention
strategies (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Figlock, 2000).
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this study is to investigate human errors in Naval Aviation MRMs.
There are two objectives: The first is to validate the model developed by Schmorrow
(1998) that attempted to predict future mishaps as a stochastic model with a variable
Poisson arrival process. The model predicted a mean number of MRMs for FY98
through to FY02. These predictions are compared to actual data collected since his study
to determine its validity and a new predictive model is developed. Secondly, data
analysis is conducted on the mishap data of the past ten years to determine if there are
significant trends within the factors attributed to MRMs. Here, simple frequency counts
giving the most prevalent types of MRM errors are replaced by a more complex analysis
to identify the trends within these errors.
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Concerns posed by continued operating and training budget reductions and
attempts to further decrease military aviation mishap rates have focused increasing
interest on alternative areas for cost savings. This thesis conducts a human factors
analysis to predict the occurrence of future MRMs and to analyze trends in causal factors.
This study addresses the following questions:
1. Are the established stochastic models (Schmorrow, 1998) for predicting
MRMs still valid in light of ensuing mishap data?
2. Are the established models (Schmorrow, 1998) the best models, or should the
models be modified?
3. Can MRMs be adequately classified through a theoretical framework,
permitting trends to be identified that reveal correlations between casual
factors?
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This study examines only those 599 Naval Aviation mishaps that were caused,
partially or wholly, by maintenance errors. Additionally, only mishaps that occurred
between FY90 and FY99 were included. The focus of this study is on maintenance-
related errors committed by maintenance and line personnel that contribute to major
mishaps; this may not depict the same pattern found in minor ones of less severity. Also,
Limitations inherent in this study relate to the manner in which the data was massaged
into a form conducive to conducting a human factors analysis. While there was a high
level of agreement between judges in determining HFACS-ME codes relevant in reported
mishaps, as the original data was not reported with the benefit of such a taxonomy, it is
conceivable that not all of the contributing factors were reported.
F. DEFINITIONS
This study uses the following definitions, as described in the US Navy's OPNAV
Instruction 3750.6Q (Department of the Navy, 1997):
Naval Aircraft. Refers to US Navy, US Naval Reserve, US Marine Corps, and US
Marine Corps Reserve aircraft.
Mishap . A mishap is an unplanned event or series of events directly involving Naval
Aircraft, which results in at least ten thousand dollars in cumulative damage to Naval
Aircraft or any personnel injury.
Mishap Class . Mishap severity classes are based on personnel injury and property
damage.
a. Class A . A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including
all aircraft damage) is $1,000,000 or greater; or a Naval Aircraft is
destroyed or missing; or any fatality or permanent total disability occurs
with direct involvement of Naval Aircraft.
b. Class B . A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including
all aircraft damage) is $200,000 or more, but less than $1,000,000; or
which results in a permanent partial disability; or the hospitalization of
five or more individuals.
c. Class C . A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including
all aircraft damage) is $10,000 or more but less then $200,000; or which
results in an injury leading to one or more lost workdays.
Mishap Categories . Naval Aircraft mishap categories are defined as:
a. Flight Mishap (FM) . Those mishaps in which there was $10,000 or greater
DOD aircraft damage or loss of a DOD aircraft, and intent for flight for
DOD aircraft existed at the time of the mishap. Other property damage,
injury, or death may or may not have occurred.
b. Flight Related Mishap (FRM) . Those mishaps in which there was less than
$10,000 DOD aircraft damage, and intent for flight (for DOD aircraft)
existed at the time of the mishap, and $10,000 or more total damage or a
defined injury or death occurred.
Aircraft Ground Mishap (AGM) . Those mishaps in which no intent for
flight existed at the time of the mishap and DOD aircraft loss; or S 10,000
or more aircraft damage, or property damage, or a defined injury occurred.




The initiatives and efforts behind the recent reductions in the number of Class A
mishaps in Naval Aviation are to be applauded; however, there is scope for further
improvement, especially in the area of human error. Analyzing and learning from human
errors have the potential to raise levels of safety to new heights. When examining an
accident involving human error there are many different theoretical approaches to choose
from (Goetsch, 1996). Some are founded in industrial safety, while others are viewed
from a complex systems perspective, emphasizing human factors and operator error.
Alternatively, some approaches use models drawn from the domain of preventive
medicine that employ epidemiological factors to analyze accidents, and yet again, other
models utilize a combination of these approaches. Table 1 outlines some of the more
robust approaches, which are discussed in detail.
Table 1. Theories of Accident Causation.
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B. ACCIDENT CAUSATION THEORIES
It was not until the 1930s, with the work of H. W. Heinrich, that a theoretical
approach was applied to accident causation. In the original edition of his text Industrial
Accident Prevention (Heinrich, 1931) he identified axioms of industrial safety that
summed up his theory in ten postulates. His axioms gave rise to the first theoretical
framework within which accidents could be viewed. While today these axioms may be
viewed as being passe, they were revolutionary in his day. Almost all of today's theories
on accident causation are based on Heinrich' s work (Peterson, 1996). Accordingly, the
less than earth-shattering impact his axioms have today pays tribute to the influence of
his work and its proliferation through the safety culture of modern society.
Perhaps the most enduring concepts from Heinrich' s work were his two
fundamental beliefs: 1) the single largest reason behind accidents is people, and 2) the
control of accidents is a management problem (Peterson, 1996). By virtue of his work,
people began to view accidents as being the result of one or both of two things: an act and
a condition. A paradigm shift followed that took the focus from physical preventative
measures, such as machine guards, inspection and housekeeping, to a causation sequence
that involved people and the situation or environment that surrounded them.
1. Heinrich's "Domino" Theory
Many consider the original accident causation theory to be Heinrich's "domino
theory" (Goetsch, 1996). While contemporary research has outshone a number of the
original concepts addressed in his axioms, many of today's widely accepted theories can
trace their roots to Heinrich's work. With his domino theory, Heinrich viewed accidents
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as occurring as a result of a related series of factors (or chain of events) that lead to the
actual accident. Heinrich's original five-factor model (Heinrich, Petersen, & Roos,
1980), can be paraphrased as a five-step (or domino) sequence as follows (see Figure 2):
1. Lack of Control: This is a management issue where the emphasis is placed on
the control exercised in a situation for an array of factors.
2. Basic Cause(s): This identifies the origin(s) of the causes and includes aspects
such as human factors, environmental factors, or job-related factors.
3. Immediate Cause(s): This includes substandard practices and conditions that
are symptoms of the basic causes.
4. Incident: This typically involves contact with the hazard, and for example,
results in a fall or impact with moving objects.
5. Personal Injury and Property Damage: This includes lacerations, fractures,
death, and material damage.
Figure 2. The Five-Step Domino Sequence (Bird, 1980).
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Each step preempts the next, causing it to occur; much the same way as one
domino falling causes the next domino in sequence to fall as well. Removal of the factors
that comprise any of the first three "dominos" will effectively intervene to prevent the
accident. This theory is built upon two central precepts: 1) injuries are caused by the
action of preceding factors; and 2) removal of the central factor (unsafe act/hazardous
condition) negates the action of the preceding factors, and in doing so, prevents accidents
and injuries (Goetsch, 1996).
2. Reason's "Swiss Cheese" Model
Another widely accepted perspective on accident causation was developed by
Reason (1990). Here a human factors approach was employed to view the vertical
association of a collection of factors that eventually lead to an accident. His "Swiss
cheese" model distinguishes between two types of errors: 1) active failures, whose effects
are felt immediately, and 2) latent conditions, whose effects may lie dormant until
triggered later, usually by other mitigating factors. The presence of defenses or
safeguards in a system can usually prevent the effects of latent conditions from being felt
by closing the "window of opportunity" during which an active failure may be
committed. Latent conditions "set the stage" for the accident while active failures tend to
be the catalyst for the accident to finally occur. The model can be thought of as slices of
Swiss cheese lined up, with each vertical slice representing a defense layer (e.g. training,
good management, teamwork, etc.) and each hole representing an active failure or latent
condition in that defense (see Figure 3). Should a situation where holes line up come to














Figure 3. Reason's "Swiss Cheese" Model (Naval Safety Center, 1996).
Reason (1997a) determined that his model was not static, but rather a metaphor
that is best represented by a moving picture, with each defensive layer coming in and out
of contention according to the characteristics of the situation. The underlying system that
causes an event to occur is characterized by Reason (1997a) as having three levels: the
person (unsafe acts), the workplace (error-provoking conditions), and the organization
(error-establishing conditions). Organizational factors are seen as the starting point for an
accident. Here strategic decisions, and their associated processes such as resource
allocation, budgeting, forecasting and planning, are initiated. These processes are then
shaped and influenced by the corporate culture before being communicated throughout
the organization to the individual workplaces. At the workplace, corporate processes
manifest themselves as insufficient staffing, undue time pressures, inadequate equipment,
insufficient training and unworkable and ambiguous procedures. These workplace
factors combine with the natural human tendency to commit errors and violations to
produce the unsafe acts. Many unsafe acts are committed, either intentionally or
unintentionally; however, very few of them actually create holes in the defenses that lead
to accidents (Reason, 1997a).
3. MacMahon's "Web of Causation" Paradigm
Through adopting a broader perspective on the cause of accidents, available
theories of accident causation have been augmented to include an epidemiological theory
of accident causation (Goetsch, 1996). These models focus upon the many interactions
between the host, or in this case the individual, and his/her environment. Models based
on this theory are used to establish causal relationships between personal characteristics,
environmental factors, and accidents (Mausner & Bahn, 1974). The key components of
the epidemiological theory of accident causation are: 1) predisposition characteristics;
and 2) situational characteristics (Goetsch, 1996). When these characteristics are
combined, they can either prevent or result in conditions that can cause an accident (see
Figure 4). An example cited by Goetsch sees an employee who is particularly susceptible
to peer pressure (predisposition characteristic) is pushed by his co-workers (situational
characteristic) to speed up his operation, the result of which would be the increased
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Figure 4. Epidemiological Theory (Goetsch, 1996).
MacMahon used the notion of a "web of causation" to postulate that accidents
never depend on single isolated causes, but rather develop as the result of chains of
causation in which each link itself is the result of a complex "genealogy of antecedents"
(Mausner & Bahn, 1974). A significant number of these antecedents combine to
conceptually form a complex web of causation factors. The breaking of interconnections
within the web at various points would serve to interrupt the flow which would lead to an
accident. The multitude of factors connecting the web in MacMahon' s model support the
notion that no one factor can be solely labeled as the cause of the accident.
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4. Combined Approach
As accident causation is still tied to the world of theories rather than fact, it would
be overly demanding to require that any one model explain all accidents (Goetsch, 1996).
A given model may adequately describe a number of accidents; however, it would not be
expected to describe all accidents, as an accident typically combines aspects of several
models. Accordingly, it is considered that only a composite model that could represent a
greater variety of causation factors would accurately model all accidents. Just as an
accident is usually described by an accumulation of factors, modeling an accident could
quite understandably be described by an accumulation of theories.
Accepting the premise that there is a preferred combined approach to accident
causation is only an intermediate step in understanding the causes of accidents (Goetsch,
1996). The next step is to classify these causes within a taxonomy that is flexible and
robust enough to adequately account for the underlying causation data. Data classified by
such a taxonomy would also be required to stand up to the rigors of statistical analysis in
order to determine not only the most frequent casual factors, but also trends relating to
accidents that could identify areas to target intervention strategies (Marx & Graeber,
1994). The fundamental goal in understanding accident theory is to be able to develop a
sound theoretical framework for reporting accidents in the hope of analyzing the
causation factors and preventing similar occurrences in the future.
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C. MAINTENANCE RELATED MISHAPS
In recent years many researchers have attempted to focus the theories of accident
causation on understanding maintenance-related mishaps (MRMs) in the aviation
industry (Marx, 1998). The aim of these efforts was to change the way these accidents
were investigated. Previously, there had been a commonly held notion that every error
could be traced back to a basic set of actions and associated conditions that precipitated
the error (Goetsch, 1996). It was realized that this was a simplistic view of the world as
most errors have multiple causes. Additionally, it was realized that traditional
investigation techniques, while appropriate for identifying the causes of equipment
failures, did not have the same success with human error-related accidents (O'Connor &
Bacchi, 1997). Typically, traditional investigations would effectively end when the cause
pointed to human error, with no effort expended in attempting to explain why the error
occurred.
Marx (1998), in a review of investigation and analysis systems for aircraft
maintenance error, highlighted the need for human factors investigation and reporting in
order for the industry to understand why people make certain mistakes. The review also
laments that although human factors investigation methods are acknowledged as being
superior, they have not been widely adopted, especially in the US. Marx (1998) cites the
following reasons for the alleged unpopularity: tendency to place blame, inability to see
through proximate causes to underlying causes, and an over-emphasis on static factors
such as who, what and when.
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Many experts agree (Gertman & Blackman, 1994; Redmill & Rajan, 1997;
Helmreich & Merritt, 1998;) that Reason's model is useful in explaining accidents;
however, it does not provide a means of delineating precursors to accidents (Weigmann
& Shappell, 1997). While it is regarded that these types of analysis systems are heading
in the right direction, more is expected. There is a requirement for a theoretical
framework that allows for the explanation of accident causation in such a manner as to
permit the identification of key reasons (and for the explanation of those reasons). It is
through such an approach that steps can be taken to avoid further occurrences of the same
type of accident.
D. HFACS MAINTENANCE EXTENSION
Efforts at the Naval Safety Center in analyzing human errors contributing to
Naval Aviation mishaps have resulted in the development of the Human Factors Analysis
and Classification System (HFACS) taxonomy (Weigmann & Shappell, 1997). The aim
of this taxonomy is to identify areas for potential intervention by fully describing factors
that are precursors to accidents. The HFACS taxonomy draws upon concepts from
Heinrich's "Domino" theory (Heinrich 1931; Heinrich, Petersen, & Roos, 1980) and
Reason's "Swiss Cheese" model (Reason, 1990; 1997b) and synthesizes them into one
succinct model, which also arguably encompasses the essence of MacMahon's "Web of
Causation" model (Mausner & Bahn, 1974). The HFACS model provides for
recognizing a set of conditions within which system operators perform. The model also
accounts for interrelationships among conditions as well as an overall sense of order or
implied hierarchy.
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This taxonomy was subsequently adopted, adapted, and augmented to classify
factors that lead to maintenance-related mishaps (Schmidt, 1996). The "Maintenance
Extension" of the original HFACS taxonomy focuses on causation factors particular to
the maintenance environment. These aspects and their relevant sub-section
classifications are given in Table 2. In a manner similar to Reason's model, the HFACS-
ME model views a maintained s performance as being influenced by a series of latent
conditions (supervisory, maintainer and working conditions) that can lead to an Unsafe
Maintainer Act. This Act can in turn lead to a mishap, injury or an unsafe maintenance
condition as depicted in Figure 5. The HFACS-ME taxonomy not only encompasses the
notion of multiple causation and a chain of events/influence, but also the hardware and
working conditions involved - as is the case with the "SHEL" model (Edwards, 1981;
Hawkins, 1997).
MISHAP/INJURY
Figure 5. HFACS Maintenance Extension Model (Schmidt, 1996).
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Table 2. Original HFACS-ME Taxonomy (Schmidt, 1996).















































HFACS-ME consists of four broad human error categories, three latent:
Supervisory Conditions (e.g. inadequate supervision), Maintainer Conditions (e.g.
preparation/training), Working Conditions (e.g. lighting/light); the fourth Maintainer Acts
(e.g. skill error), is active. The three orders of maintenance error (first, second, and third)
reflect a decomposition of the error types from a macro to a micro perspective. Each
successive order provides for greater granularity, serving the respective purposes of
identifying problem areas, prioritizing potential targets, and tailoring intervention
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strategies. A brief description of the original taxonomy with illustrative examples is
included in Appendix A.
The HFACS-ME taxonomy was initially applied to Naval Aviation Class A FMs
for FYs 90-97 (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Hardee, 1997). This study revealed that HFAC-
ME was effective in capturing the nature of, and relationships among, latent conditions
and active failures present in Class A MRMs. It was found that 75 percent of all Naval
Aviation Class A mishaps reported an instance of Maintainer Error, whereas 40 percent
reported Maintainer Violations. Squadron Supervisory conditions were reported in 67
percent of these mishaps, with Organizational Supervisory conditions reported in 21
percent. In viewing the results, it was felt that the existing investigation and reporting
process/system are not conducive to determining the impact of Maintainer and Working
conditions.
Schmorrow (1998), in a study of 470 Naval Aviation MRMs, showed five second-
order HFACS-ME causal dimensions — Organizational Supervision, Squadron
Supervision, Maintainer Crew Coordination, Maintainer Error, and Maintainer Violation
— are present in over 95 percent of Class A, B, and C MRMs. He employed stochastic
modeling to forecast the frequency of MRMs given preservation of the status quo and the
projected frequency given reductions of 10, 20 and 30 percent of certain taxonomy
categories. He estimated that a reduction of 10 percent in any single error category
would result in an average cost savings of over one million dollars annually. Overall, this
study demonstrated the potential for calculating the return on investment for specified
MRM control measures (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Figlock, 2000).
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Teeters (1999) also employed the HFACS-ME taxonomy, in this instance to
identify causal factors in 124 maintenance-related incidents (including MRMs, reported
hazards, and personal injuries) of the Naval Reserve Fleet Logistic Support Wing. The
aim of this study was to determine if HFACS-ME would be successful in capturing
causal dimensions in MRMs of all severity levels. With the assistance of the taxonomy
he identified two primary problem areas: 1) contractor oversight and 2) procedural
violations. Subsequently, this enabled the projection of future MRM occurrences and the
potential impact of targeted interventions (Schmidt, Figlock, & Teeters, 1999).
E. SUMMARY
The key concept in thinking about human error reduction is that human beings do
not commit errors because they are unintelligent or because they are wrong (Peterson,
1996). In many instances, errors are committed when in fact they were perceived to be
the logical thing to do as the situation presented itself. In essence, human errors are
caused by the situations in which people find themselves - physical situations,
psychological situations, environmental situations, and so on. Once errors are perceived
in such a manner, the next step is to be able to adequately comprehend why accidents
occur and how human error plays a part.
While there are many theories of accident causation, there is a central theme that
is common to the majority of them: accidents are the product of multiple contributing
factors, not one primary factor. Additionally, rather than relying on one particular model
that emphasizes a certain facet of accident causation, a combined approach appears to
provide a more robust perspective. This is particularly the case with understanding Naval
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Aviation MRMs. In this instance, the HFACS-ME taxonomy has been successfully
utilized to analyze MRMs and categorize their causal dimensions. Once common error
forms are identified in MRMs, it has also been demonstrated that the results can be
successfully used to model and forecast future occurrences and the possible benefits of
implementing planned intervention measures.
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This study involves the analysis of an existing database of Naval Aviation mishap
reports maintained by the Naval Safety Center (NSC). The reports contain data relating
to the mishap as compiled by accident investigators. As the data contained in the reports
does not lend itself to human factors analysis in its original form, a post hoc analysis of
contributing factors is conducted. Each maintenance-related mishap (MRM) is evaluated
and the respective Human Factors Analysis and Classification System Maintenance
Extension (HFACS-ME) codes corresponding to the causal factors identified in the
investigation are tabulated for analysis. Similar to the previous research by Schmorrow
(1998), stochastic models of MRMs are constructed and evaluated to predict the
occurrence of future MRMs. Additionally, a trend analysis of MRM casual factors is
undertaken. From these two analyses, the number of MRMs over the next five fiscal
years is estimated, and trends within MRMs identified.
B. DATA COLLECTION
1. Naval Aviation Safety Program
The Department of the Navy's (1997) Naval Aviation Safety Program (OPNAV
Instruction 3750.6Q) details the Naval Aviation Safety Program and its manner of
implementation. It establishes safety program requirements, including those specifying
mishap and hazard investigation, reporting, and analysis. Mishap investigation reports
are produced for all Class A, B and C mishaps in an attempt to identify the contributing
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factors and to recommend intervention strategies as appropriate. It is from these reports
that data for this study was obtained, with the aim of gaining an overall perspective of
mishap contributing factors, rather than a case by case analysis.
2. Safety Information Management System Database
The NSC maintains a database comprised of codified incident reports that are
accessed via the Safety Information Management System (SIMS). Database information
is entered manually by NSC staff from original incident reports. SIMS has the capacity
to produce a variety of on-line and batch-processed reports, including frequency counts
on specified data fields, flight hour data, and narrative event summaries.
3. Data Purification
Class A, B, and C MRM data for FY90 to FY99 was obtained from the SIMS
database, augmented to incorporate HFACS-ME codes pertaining to each of the MRM
casual factors, and manually entered into a computer database. The HFACS-ME codes
were further augmented at the third-order level to better accommodate factors observed in
the more minor class B and C MRMs that are mainly FRMs and AGMs respectively (see
Appendix B). This did not affect the second-order categories used for the trend analysis
in this study. From the computer database, the data was imported into data analysis
software for subsequent stochastic modeling and categorical data analysis. Additionally,
the data in the database was used to prototype the Maintenance Error Data Analysis and
Reporting Tool (MEDART), which was developed by the author in conjunction with this
study. The purpose of the MEDART is to provide a readily accessible reporting and
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analysis tool for aviation maintenance-related safety personnel. Using the tool, they can
generate a myriad of summary reports in order to gain insight into potential problem
areas from which they could consider implementing local mishap intervention strategies
(see Appendix C for a discussion of the prototype software tool).
C. DATA ANALYSIS
The first part of the study investigates the frequency of MRMs and associated
HFACS-ME codes, attempting to validate Schmorrow's (1998) models. Whether
existing stochastic models with a variable Poisson arrival process prove to be sufficient
for predicting the occurrence of future mishaps, or they require modification, the resultant
output is a predicted mean number of MRMs for FYOO through to FY04. Secondly, data
analysis is conducted on the MRM data of the past ten years to determine if there are
significant trends within the casual factors attributed to MRMs. Simple frequency counts
giving the most prevalent types of MRM errors are replaced by a more complex analysis
to identify the trends within these errors. For instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that
there is a possible correlation between the occurrence of an unintentional error relating to
a maintainer's lack of training and the absence of adequate supervision for that
maintainer. Here, stochastic models, exploratory data analysis, and conditioning are
utilized to summarize the MRMs and evaluate trends in the casual factors.
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As previously stated, this study is divided into two main areas of investigation:
model validation and trend analysis. Schmorrow (1998) focused on investigating the
frequency with which maintenance-related mishaps (MRMs) occur in an attempt to
devise an appropriate model to describe the underlying arrival process associated with
those accidents. He considered models such as the Poisson process with homogenous
and non-homogenous piece-wise constant rates, a moving average estimator, and a
variable Poisson process. Each of these models was tested for fit using a modified
denominator-free chi-squared (%") statistical test which is considered a superior test to the
classical %~ test when the data values are small and include zeros (Freeman & Tukey,
1950). After evaluating the models, he found the variable Poisson process model to
provide the best fit in describing MRMs
The second area of focus, trend analysis, involved the exploration of the human
factor causal dimensions attributed to the MRM data. In this instance, an analysis was
conducted on the pairwise dependencies of second-order Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME) categories. Second-order
categories were chosen for the analysis in preference to first-order, which were
considered to give insufficient granularity, and third-order, which were considered to be
too sparsely distributed. This analysis revealed relationships between the causal factors
attributed of MRMs. Correlation matrices, intersection matrices and conditional
relationships were investigated to determine the these relationships.
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During the course of this study it was identified that certain HFACS-ME
classifications should be renamed to more closely reflect the scope of the grouping, while
additional third-order HFACS-ME categories are required in order to give a more precise
representation of the errors present in MRMs. Subsequently, several categories were
added to the taxonomy and others renamed. An updated table of HFACS-ME
classifications is given in Appendix B.
B. VALIDATING PREVIOUS STOCHASTIC MODELS
The variable Poisson process model employed by Schmorrow (1998) generates an
estimator based on a function fitted to historical data (Devore, 1995). Upon fitting a
curve to historical data, the hypothetical Poisson process mean is predicted. This value at
some month t is assumed to come from a Poisson process with mean X which follows the
exponential decay equation log (Xi) = (3 + p\ * t. Schmorrow (1998) used a maximum
likelihood function to estimate values for (3o and (3i, however, this study employs a
generalized linear model that produces similar results. Variable Poisson process models
are derived for mishap type as well as mishap class, and the coefficients of the equations
pertaining to each of these models are given in Table 3 (note: the coefficients are
presented in the form log (X,) = Po + Pi * t, rather than in the original Xt = (3o * exp((3i * t)
format). In each instance, the previous study found that the modified denominator-free %"
goodness of fit test produced results that were above the 0.05 threshold established for the
suitability of the models.
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Table 3. Coefficients of the Previously Fitted Variable Poisson Process Models for
MRMs (Schmorrow, 1998).















It is observed that given the same period (i.e., FY90 - FY 97), the number of
MRMs in each class and type reported in the previous study differed from that obtained
in this study. This is an understandable occurrence in some situations as, on occasion,
mishaps are re-evaluated by the relevant authorities and re-classified. It was determined
that in the majority of instances, some materiel-related mishaps were previously included
in the data. The corrected distributions of MRMs by class and type for the period FY90 -
FY99 are given in Table 4. Mishap class and type data is also displayed graphically in
Figure 6, where it can be seen that 77 percent of all MRMs are Class C mishaps;
alternatively, it is shown that 52 percent of all MRMs are Aircraft-Ground mishaps.
Table 4. MRMs by Class and Type for FY90-FY99.

























Figure 6. MRMs by Class and Type for FY90- FY99.
In addition to the slightly inflated number of MRMs, it was discovered that
previously, only MRMs attributed to tactical aircraft (e.g., F/A-18) and rotary wing
aircraft (e.g., H-60) were included. It is understandable that with the inclusion of all
Naval Aviation aircraft, the predicted numbers of MRMs for the period FY98 - FY99 in
the original model were not as close to the actual counts observed. As the models are
derived from the Poisson distribution, predicted values within 2 yjX of actual values are
regared as being acceptable. Table 5 shows that the differences between the figures for
Class B MRMs are negligible; however, most of the other categories differ significantly.
Accordingly, it can be considered that the previously developed variable Poisson process
models did not adequately predicted the occurrences ofMRMs for this two-year period.









Flight 11.6 26 10.4 17
Flight-Related 1.8 3 1.5 4
Aircraft-Ground 20.2 24 18.1 20
Class A 4.1 7 3.6 5
Class B 5.3 5 5.0 4
Class C 20.0 41 17.0 32
Total 33.5 53 30.0 41
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As the previous models were not as precise as anticipated, more accurate models
were, this time based on the current database. Mishap data from the 120 months of the
period FY90 - FY99 was input into a Poisson generalized linear model, which utilized a
logarithmic link function. Table 6 shows the values of the coefficients that were
calculated, the probabilities obtained, and the suitability of the models. The denominator-
free X goodness of fit test (see Appendix E for the S-Plus function that was used to
calculate the probability of fit) was employed to determine the suitability of the models,
with the 0.05 set as the level of significance.
Table 6. Validation of Variable Poisson Process Model for FY90 - FY99.
Mishap Classification fa A KZn*^ Suitability
Flight 1.014 -0.006 0.155 Not unusual
Flight-Related -0.151 -0.013 0.999 Not unusual
Aircraft-Ground 1.410 -0.008 0.251 Not unusual
Class A 0.081 -0.010 0.967 Not unusual
Class B -0.245 -0.006 0.997 Not unusual
Class C 1.762 -0.008 0.062 Not unusual
Total 2.039 -0.008 0.008 Unusual
While most models that were developed were regarded as being adequately fitting
the data, the model corresponding to total mishaps was not evaluated as being suitable.
This revelation is mildly alarming; however, a closer examination of the other
(subordinate) models reveals that they are declining at different rates. Accordingly, it is
understandable that this aggregated model could not be fit as closely to the data. In
review, it is considered that Schmorrow's (1998) models and his subsequent predictions
were not accurate. The models that were developed in this study have an advantage over
the previous models in that they were developed with the benefit of an additional two
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years of data. Additionally, they were produced from a database that is more complete
and accurate. Figure 7 shows the equation fitted to the total MRM data, while graphs for

























Figure 7. Variable Poisson Process Model for Total MRMs
C. MISHAP OCCURRENCE PROBABILITIES AND PREDICTIONS
The values obtained in evaluating the equations derived by the variable Poisson
process model represent the means of the hypothetical Poisson process that in turn
describes the way in which the MRMs occur. These means can be used to predict the
probability of the occurrence of a particular class, or type, of future MRM. Accordingly,
probability tables can constructed and be utilized to predict the likelihood of these MRMs
and provide an insight into a conceivable environment facing Naval Aviation in the near
future. Table 7 presents a summary of the probability tables found in Appendix G.
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Table 7. Predicted Average Monthly MRM Probabilities for FYOO.
Mishap Number of Maintenance-Related Mishaps
Classification 1 2 3 4 5 6
Flight 0.29 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00
Flight-Related 0.85 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aircraft-Ground 0.22 0.33 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.00
Class A 0.75 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Class B 0.70 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Class C 0.11 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.02
By expanding the timeframe of the predictions given in Table 7 to one that
encompasses the next five years, a more pertinent overview of the potential impact of
MRMs can be gleaned. The hypothetical expected number of MRMs per year were
calculated for the period FYOO - FY04 using the aforementioned Poisson process model.
Summing the hypothetical monthly means generated by the model gives the expected
number of MRMs per FY (see Table 8). To avoid the dilemma of using a reportedly
unsuitable model, the model pertaining to total MRMs was not used to obtain the totals in
Table 8. As total MRMs is equal to the sum of either FMs, FRMs and AGMs or Class
As, Bs, and Cs, the total predicted MRMs are derived from individually summing the
predicted MRMs for mishap class and mishap type and then averaging these two figures.
Table 8. Predicted MRMs for FYOO - FY04.
Mishap Classification 00 01 02 03 04
Flight 15.0 13.9 12.9 12.0 11.1
Flight-Related 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0
Aircraft-Ground 18.1 16.4 14.9 13.6 12.4
Class A 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1
Class B 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.2
Class C 27.1 24.7 22.6 20.6 18.9
Total 35.0 31.9 29.1 26.6 24.4
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D. DATA EXPLORATION AND TREND ANALYSIS
The next phase of this study involved an attempt to determine relationships
between the occurrences of the ten second-order HFACS-ME categories. Each MRM
was evaluated to assess which of the ten second-order categories were considered to be
mishap causal factors (see Table 9 for a summary of second-order HFACS-ME categories
by mishap classification). Each evaluation was recorded as a binary row vector, thus
indicating the presence or absence of each particular second-order category. This
resulted in a 599 by 10 binary matrix, with MRMs during the period FY90 - FY99
defining the rows and second-order HFACS-ME categories defining the columns.
Initially, the relationships between the categories were viewed by taking the
binary asymmetric matrix and using it to create a correlation matrix (see Table 10).
Scanning this matrix revealed that the highest correlation occurred between Squadron
Supervisory Conditions (SQN) and Maintainer Violation (VIO), with a correlation of
0.320. Other notable correlates were Environmental Working Conditions (ENV) and
Workspace Working Conditions (WRK) at 0.284 and Squadron Supervisory Conditions
(SQN) and Maintainer Error (ERR) at 0.2 1 1
.
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Flight 127 106 5 14 6 3 1 128 69
Flight-Related 22 17 3 27 12
Aircraft-Ground 82 211 38 52 9 8 13 1 154 161
Class A 39 50 4 7 3 36 30
Class B 33 44 8 3 1 39 23
Class C 159 240 31 59 11 8 16 2 234 189
Total 462 668 86 138 30 16 32 4 618 484
Table 10. Correlation Matrix for the Reporting of Second-Order HFACS-ME
Categories in FY90 - FY99.
ORG SQN MED CRW RDY ENV EQP WRK ERR VIO
ORG 1.000 0.084 -0.070 -0.012 0.035 -0.032 0.097 -0.042 0.104 0.032
SQN 1.000 0.029 0.175 0.084 -0.011 0.066 -0.051 0.211 0.320
MED 1.000 0.156 -0.029 0.058 0.031 -0.015 -0.059 0.024
CRW 1.000 -0.038 -0.035 0.056 -0.020 0.176 0.167
RDY 1.000 0.143 0.104 -0.008 0.090 0.003
ENV 1.000 -0.016 0.284 -0.045 -0.027
EQP 1.000 -0.009 0.043 0.041
WRK 1.000 -0.049 -0.040
ERR 1.000 0.008
VIO 1.000
Next, the binary asymmetric matrix was multiplied by its transpose to compute an
upper diagonal matrix (see Table 1 1). This resultant matrix defines the number of MRMs
that cite the combination given by the second-order category indicated by the row, with
the second-order category given by the column. For example, 62 MRMs cited both
Organizational Supervisory Conditions (ORG) and Maintainer Error (ERR) as causal
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factors. Figures on the main diagonal represent the number of MRMs that cite the
corresponding HFACS-ME category.
th
Table 11. Number of MRMs Citing the Second-Order Category of the fn Row With
th
the Second-Order Category of the J Column
ORG SQN MED CRW RDY ENV EQP WRK ERR VIO
ORG 142 63 4 12 3 1 6 62 42
SQN 182 11 28 5 2 6 89 83
MED 25 7 1 1 6 8
CRW 43 2 27 22
RDY 7 1 1 5 2
ENV 6 1 1 1




Each element of the upper diagonal matrix given in Table 1 1 was then divided by
the total number of MRMs to reveal a proportional matrix (see Table 12). This matrix
gives the proportion of MRMs that cite the combination given by the second-order
category indicated by the row, with the second-order category given by the column. The
more significant combinations of categories are seen more readily using this method, with
Squadron Supervisory Conditions (SQN) and Maintainer Error (ERR) reported in 14.9
percent of mishaps being the most frequently occurring pairing of categories. Squadron
Supervisory Conditions (SQN) and Maintainer Violation (VIO) combinations were also
quite prevalent at 13.9 percent.
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Table 12. Proportional Matrix of Pairwise Combinations of Second-Order HFACS-
ME Categories for FY90 - FY99 MRMs.
ORG SQN MED CRW RDY ENV EQP WRK ERR VIO
ORG 0.237 0.105 0.007 0.020 0.005 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.104 0.070
SQN 0.304 0.018 0.047 0.008 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.149 0.139
MED 0.042 0.012 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.013
CRW 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.045 0.037
RDY 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.003
ENV 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002
EQP 0.017 0.000 0.008 0.007
WRK 0.003 0.000 0.000
ERR 0.287 0.080
VIO 0.219
Another important component of the analysis of trends within the data is in
observing conditional proportions of causal factors that occur in mishaps (see Table 13).
In this instance, the value obtained from the table represents the proportion of MRMs
citing the causal factor identified by the row, given that mishap cite the causal factor, as
identified by the column. By way of an example, should an MRMs cite Environmental
Working Conditions (identified by the column ENV) as a causal factor, it is predicted that
33.3 percent of occurrences will also cite Squadron Supervisory Conditions (identified by
the row SQN) as a causal factor.
Table 13. Conditional Proportion Matrix of Pairwise Combinations of Second-
Order HFACS-ME categories for Mishaps FY90 - FY99.
ORG SQN MED CRW RDY ENV EQP WRK ERR VIO
ORG 0.346 0.160 0.279 0.429 0.167 0.600 0.000 0.360 0.321
SQN 0.444 0.440 0.651 0.714 0.333 0.600 0.000 0.517 0.634
MED 0.028 0.060 0.163 0.000 0.167 0.100 0.000 0.035 0.061
CRW 0.085 0.154 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.157 0.168
RDY 0.021 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.100 0.000 0.029 0.015
ENV 0.007 0.011 0.040 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.500 0.006 0.008
EQP 0.042 0.033 0.040 0.047 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.031
WRK 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.000
ERR 0.437 0.489 0.240 0.628 0.714 0.167 0.500 0.000 0.366
VIO 0.296 0.456 0.320 0.512 0.286 0.167 0.400 0.000 0.279
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Any value in the matrix reported at 65 percent or above is considered to be
significant enough to warrant further analysis. Adopting this delineating criterion reveals
that three combinations are considered to be significant. Given that Maintainer Readiness
(RDY) is cited in an MRM, it is particularly likely that either Squadron Supervisory
Conditions (SQN) or Maintainer Error (ERR) are also reported as causal factors.
Similarly, given that Maintainer Crew Coordination (CRW) is cited as a causal factor in
an MRM, then it is quite likely that Squadron Supervisory Conditions (SQN) will also be
cited.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The US government's unwavering requirements upon the military demand high
levels of operational readiness, equipment availability, and personnel training, all within
a climate of reduced budgets and downsizing. The seemingly inequitable notion that
most public sector organizations are being expected to do more with less is today's
reality. Asset preservation is of paramount importance as funding is simply not available
to provide replacements in the short-term. Naval Aviation mishaps impact mission
capability, operational readiness, and costs, not to mention the human cost. In line with
this, it is regarded that through the reduction of avoidable human errors that contribute to
mishaps, existing Naval Aviation assets will be preserved and the associated repair or
replacement costs will be avoided. To achieve this, the role human error plays in aviation
mishaps must be identified, and appropriate intervention strategies developed and
programs aimed at reducing the causes of these errors, implemented. Contemporary
accident causation theories suggest that accidents are the result of a complex combination
of errors. The question of where to target intervention strategies is the key aspect in
effectively combating human error.
Substantial advances have been made in the area of aircrew error reduction; it is
now time for similar bounds to be made in the area of maintainer error reduction. This
study has confronted this dilemma and has again validated the use of the Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME) taxonomy as
being sufficient for the classification of human factors contributing to maintenance-
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related mishaps (MRMs). Should such a framework be adopted for the investigation and
reporting of mishaps, then a much clearer picture will be given of the full impact of
contributing human factors. From this basis, mishap prevention programs should be
tailored to intervene and prevent active failures from causing MRMs or for latent
conditions from becoming the catalyst for them.
B. CONCLUSIONS
This study concludes that the modified HFACS-ME taxonomy provides an
adequate framework for the classification of MRM causal factors. The newly developed
stochastic models show that the variable Poisson process model provides a satisfactorily
robust, yet straightforward model for predicting future mishaps. The trend analysis of the
causal factors of MRMs revealed that there is a significant relationship between the
causal dimensions of Squadron Supervisory Conditions (SQN) and Maintainer Violation
(VIO), enough to warrant the suggestion that the correlation of these aspects be further
investigated.
The words of Box (1978) have been a constant companion during the course of
this study, "All models are wrong. Some models are useful." To this end the models
developed in this study are presented as simply a guide to permit the exploration of a
possible future state. The extrapolation of current trends observed in the data may give
some valuable insights into the future environment surrounding the modeled data. While
historical data might not be able to accurately forecast future events, the outlook that it
provides gives a starting point from which to hypothesize about probable outcomes.
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The development of models predicting future MRMs highlighted one of the
serious pitfalls of data aggregation. While suitable models were developed and fitted to
Class A, B and C mishaps, as well as to Flight, Flight-Related, and Aircraft-Ground
mishaps, the rates at which these models are declining differ significantly enough to
cause difficulties in developing a single model for total MRMs. Accordingly, scant
regard should be paid to such aggregated models; attention instead should be focused on
prediction models derived from more homogeneous data sets.
It was observed that very few mishaps recorded contributing factors relating to
Working Conditions. While it is considered that Working Conditions is a valid
classification in the HFACS-ME taxonomy, it is felt that existing investigation and
reporting methodologies do not give such factors sufficient credence so as to warrant
their inclusion in the mishap investigation report. It is quite conceivable that these
aspects do contribute to mishaps; however, it is only by promoting the awareness of such
aspects through employing appropriate investigating and reporting methodologies, that
these aspects will be effectively accounted for.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Present mishap investigation procedures outlined in OPNAV Instruction 3750.6Q
do not incorporate specific guidance in addressing the wide variety of human factors that
can contribute to the cause of MRMs. Through incorporating a taxonomy similar to that
embodied in HFACS-ME, the investigation of MRMs will be more risorous and areas for
intervention will be more readily identified and prioritized. Accordingly, it is
recommended that the Naval Safety Center and Naval Air Systems Command instigate
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action to revise current mishap investigation procedures to incorporate a theoretical
framework, such as the HFACS-ME taxonomy, that fosters the thorough examination of
all pertinent human factors. This action would make the reporting mechanism more
complete, as well as more sensitive to multiple causes of the mishap. Subsequent
analyses of this information would be more refined than present studies and more closely
model the true causes of MRMs.
Analysis of the various causal factors attributed to MRMs has revealed significant
relationships between certain classifications. It is recommended that the Naval Safety
Center and Naval Air Systems Command commission further research efforts to identify
correlations between the causal dimensions with the view to understand these
interactions. It is anticipated that such a study would address questions such as whether
one factor precipitates the other, or whether implementing intervention strategies aimed
at addressing one dimension would invariably reduce the occurrence of the other.
Through comprehension of such correlations, intervention strategies could be more
effectively and efficiently employed. (Postscript annotation: The Naval Safety Center, as
a result of this and previous studies, has elected to incorporate HFACS-ME into OPNAV
3750.R, the new Naval Aviation Safety program instruction.)
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APPENDIX A. ORIGINAL HFACS-ME CLASSIFICATION CODES
The following descriptions are taken from Schmidt, Schmorrow & Hardee (1997)
and are used with permission.
Latent Supervisory Conditions that can
contribute to an active failure includes both
unforeseen and squadron.
Examples of unforseen supervisory conditions
include:
• An engine that falls off of a stand during a
change-out evolution due to an unforeseen
hazard of a high seas state (Hazardous
Operation)
• A manual omits a step in a maintenance
procedure, such as leaving out an o-ring that
causes a fuel leak (Inadequate
Documentation)
• The poor layout of system components that
do not permit direct observation of
maintenance being performed (Inadequate
Design)
Examples of squadron supervisory conditions
include:
• A supervisor who does not ensure that
maintenance personnel are wearing
required personal protective gear
(Inadequate Supervision)
• A supervisor who directs a maintainer to
perform a task without considering risks,
such as driving a truck through a hangar
(Inappropriate Operations)
• A supervisor who neglects to correct
maintainers who routinely bend the rules
when they perform a common task
(Uncorrected problem)
• A supervisor who willfully orders a
maintainer to wash an aircraft without proper
safety gear (Supervisory Violation)
Latent Maintainer Conditions that can
contribute to an active failure include medical,
crew coordination, and readiness.
Examples of maintainer medical conditions
include:
• A maintainer who has a marital problem and
cannot focus on a maintenance action
(Mental State)
• A maintainer who worked for 20 hours
straight and suffers from fatigue (Physical
State)
• A maintainer who is short can not visually





• A maintainer who leads a taxiing aircraft into
another due to improper hand signals
(Communication)
• A maintainer who performs a task, not in
accordance with standard procedures,
because the maintainer was overly
submissive to a superior (Assertiveness)
• A maintainer who downplays a downing
discrepancy to meet the flight schedule
(Adaptability/Flexibility)
Examples of maintainer readiness conditions
include:
• A maintainer who is working on an aircraft
skipped the requisite OJT evolution
(Preparation^"raining)
• A maintainer who engages in a procedure
that they have not been qualified to perform
(Qualification/Certification)
• A maintainer who is intoxicated on the job
(Violation)
Latent Working Conditions that can contribute
to an active failure include environmental,
equipment, and workspace.
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Examples of environmental working conditions
include:
• A maintainer who is working at night on the
flightline does not see a tool he left behind
(Lighting/Light)
• A maintainer who is securing an aircraft in a
driving rain fails to properly attach the chains
(Weather/Exposure)
• A maintainer who is working on a pitching




of equipment working conditions
• A maintainer who is using a defective test
set does not pre-check it before
troubleshooting (Damaged)
• A maintainer who starts working on landing
gear without a jack because all in use
(Unavailable)
• A maintainer who uses an old manual
because a CD-ROM reader is not available
(Dated/Uncertified)
Examples of workspace working conditions
include:
• A maintainer who is working in a hangar bay
cannot properly position the maintenance
stand (Confining)
• A maintainer who is spotting an aircraft with
his view obscured by catapult steam
(Obstructed)
• A maintainer who is unable to perform a
corrosion inspection that is beyond his reach
(Inaccessible)
Maintainer Acts are active failures, which
directly or indirectly cause mishaps, or lead to
Latent Maintenance Condition, they include
errors and violations.
Examples of errors in maintainer acts include:
• A maintainer who misses a hand signal and
backs a forklift into an aircraft (Attention)
• A maintainer who is very familiar with a
procedure may reverse steps in a sequence
(Memory)
• A maintainer who inflates an aircraft tire to a
pressure required by a different aircraft
(Knowledge/Rule)
• A maintainer who roughly handles a delicate




• A maintainer who engages in practices,
condoned by management, that bend the
rules (Routine)
• A maintainer who strays from accepted
procedures to save time, bending a rule
(Infraction)
• A maintainer who willfully breaks standing
rules disregarding the consequences
(Exceptional)
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APPENDIX B. MODIFIED HFACS-ME CLASSIFICATIONS
Table Bl. HFACS-ME Taxonomy
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APPENDIX C. MEDART SOFTWARE TOOL
A. OVERVIEW
To support the data purification effort, Microsoft Access 97 was used to develop a
prototype software tool - the Maintenance Error Data Analysis and Reporting Tool
(MEDART). The purpose of MEDART is to provide a readily accessible mishap
reporting and analysis tool for maintenance-related safety personnel. While Access 97
provides rudimentary functionality for data analysis and display, it lacks a degree of
flexibility and is not quite as user-friendly or aesthetically pleasing as it could be. As
such a custom-built application, using Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) programming
code, was developed to provide a much more effective interface from the user's
perspective.
B. FUNCTIONALITY
Although the MEDART software tool was developed solely as a prototype
version to support data purification, a secondary aim was to display the types of feedback
the users could expect to see when using such a tool. Accordingly, its functionality is
presently somewhat limited. The basic functionality of MEDART is divided into four
main areas: data entry, database querying, database reporting, and data graphing (see
Figure CI). Some of these areas were then broken down into other, distinct sub-areas. It
is suggested that additional functionality such as an improved and expanded reporting
facility, greater freedom to select multiple data items within each criterion of a query, and









Figure CI. Flow Chart Depicting Basic MEDART Functionality.
1. Data Entry
The data entry module is rather elementary; however, where possible the user is
assisted in entering data through the provision of pull-down boxes, complete with
suggested data values. This method significant reduces the amount of typing the user is
required to do, as well as reducing the potential for errors through incorrectly entered
data. An edit facility was not incorporated as it was felt that allowing users the ability to
edit existing data might cause the inadvertent and unintentional modification of stored
data. Should the user have a specific need to modify data in the database, then a user
with a rudimentary knowledge of Access 97 would be able to easily address this need by
directly manipulating the underlying tables in MEDART.
2. Database querying
There are two basic methods of querying the database: filtering by selected
HFACS-ME category, or by identifying other pertinent aspects of the mishap, such as
mishap class, date, aircraft model, and so on. Both these methods display a subset of
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mishaps, one by one, that meet the selection criteria. A count of the number of MRMs
that satisfy the criteria is also presented to the user. When utilising the latter method of
database query, the user is able to select multiple criteria with which to filter the
information in the database. Figure C2 shows the Maintenance Mishap Query screen, in
this instance the selection criteria has been set so as to only display those Class A MRMs
that were also F/A-18 Flight mishaps. The aqua blue background of the class, aircraft
type and mishap type data fields in Figure C2 signifies that these fields have been
specified in the filtering criteria (note: colors are not depicted in this appendix section).
BE Summary of Mishap
Maintenance Mishap Query
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Contrbutjng Factors
1-S^sLDescfpSpn j
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1
3 I >l I -I of 10 (Hftered)
FigureC2. Maintenance Mishap Query Screen.
3. Database Reporting
Due to time constraints in the development of this application, this particular area
of functionality was not expanded. A number of basic reports are available to the user;
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these range from the distribution of all MRMs by HFACS-ME category (see Figure C3),
all MRMs with associated factors, to the distribution of MRMs by service. Each report is
formatted on the screen to represent a printed page, hence, the production of hard-copy
reports is as simple as clicking a button.
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Figure C3. Screen Query - Distribution of MRMs by HFACS-ME Code.
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4. Data Graphing
Custom VBA code was written to interface with Microsoft Access 97 's charting
facility, which in turn is a subset of Excel 97 's charting functionality. Predefined graphs
are available to the novice user that display aspects such as mishap percentage by aircraft
model, the location of MRM by aircraft model, and the distribution of class of MRM by
aircraft model. For the more adventurous user, a custom two-dimensional graph can be
created by selecting mishap criteria for the X and Y axes, then selecting certain values for
each criterion to then be displayed. Figure C4 shows the graph created using the
MEDART Expert Graph function, where all Class A mishaps for selected aircraft during
the period CY90- CY99 are given. Giving the more proficient user access to the Expert
Graph function permits users to create graphs the cater to their specific needs. These
graphs can then be copied into other software packages such as Word and PowerPoint,
and used in reports and presentations to highlight aspects of mishap occurrence.
as Expeil Graph
Figure C4. Class A MRMs (CY90 - CY99) For Selected Aircraft Models.
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C. MEDART OUTPUT
Whether by using the built-in reports, charts or tables to display information, or
by exporting the data to other software packages to display the information in a slightly
different form, a significant amount of information about the underlying data can be
gleaned by the user. Figure C5 shows the percentage of Class A mishaps for CY90-99 by
mishap type, a graph that is one of the built in options presented to users under the
MEDART graphing functionality. This particular pie chart shows that an overwhelming
majority of Class A MRMs were flight mishaps (FM). This is not overly surprising when
considering the definition of a Class A MRM (i.e. significant damage/loss with the intent
for flight) and the greater associated probability of catastrophe in the event of a mishap.
Despite this knowledge, it is regarded that this information would almost certainly







Figure C5. Class A MRMs By MRM Type for CY90-99.
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The means of providing information to the user is not limited to just those
functions provided within the MEDART application. Almost all US military personnel
have access to the Microsoft Office suite of applications. The information displayed in
Table CI was derived from mishap data exported from Microsoft Access 97 into a
Microsoft Excel 97 spreadsheet. Within Excel, VBA macros were written to summarize
the MRMs. This spreadsheet data was then copied into Microsoft Word 97 and reshaped
into the table as presented. With a minimum of effort and an introductory knowledge of
VBA and the Microsoft Office suite, similar results could be obtained by any user.
Table CI. Class A MRMs by CY.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
January 3 2 2 1 8
February 1 1
March 1 2 2 1 1 7
April 1 1 1 3 2 8
May 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
June 3 1 2 1 1 8
July 3 2 2 1 1 9
August 1 2 1 1 1 1 7
September 1 1 2
October 2 2 1 1 2 1 9
November 1 1 1 1 1 5
December 2 2
Total 13 10 12 8 6 4 5 4 5 5 72
In a similar manner, the graphs depicted in Figures C6, C7 and C8 were created
from mishap data exported as an Excel 97 spreadsheet. In Excel, the MRMs were
summarized into tables that calculated the frequency with which each HFACS-ME code
occurred in Class A MRMs from CY90 to CY99. The three graphs depict each the three
hierarchical orders of HFACS-ME codes respectively. Figure C6 shows the First Order
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HFACS-ME categories and again it can be seen that a significant proportion of Class A
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Figure C6. Class A MRMs (CY90-99) by First Order HFACS-ME Categories.
As a result of examining Figure C7, a greater level of detail can be gleaned about
the distribution of causal factors for Class A MRMs. Predictably, the causal dimensions
of Organisational (ORG) and Squadron (SQN), which pertain to the superior Supervisory
Condition category, and Error (ERR) and Violation (VIO), which pertain to the superior
Maintainer Acts category, are the most frequently observed. The additional information
presented by this graph (over that presented in Figure C6) suggests that local (or
Squadron) supervisory aspects and unintentional maintainer errors are the most prevalent
types of errors in each of their corresponding first order categories.
While difficult to read in the scale presented, Figure C8 gives an even greater
level of definition to the causal factors of Class A MRMs in CY90-99. The third order
causal dimensions of inadequate supervision, inappropriate processes, supervisory
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misconduct, and infraction of regulations were each attributed as causal factors in 20 or
more of the 79 Class A MRMs during the period.
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Figure C8. Class A MRMs (CY90-99) by Third Order HFACS-ME Categories.
The data exported to the Excel spreadsheet was also summarized in a manner to
produce Table C2. This table combines mishap type with the four first order HFACS-ME
classifications. Other than the total number of MRMs that reported an instance of each of
the four codes, the percentage breakdown of HFACS-ME codes across mishap type is
also given. This shows that during the period CY90 - CY99, 84 percent of Class A
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MRMs that reported Supervisory Conditions as a causal factor were also flight mishaps.
A figure of similar magnitude is associated with Maintainer Acts and flight mishaps.
This could quite possibly be an area for concern; however, intuition suggests that there is
a propensity to point blame in catastrophic accidents, particularly at the person who
performed the maintenance and his/her supervisors.
Table C2. Class A MRM First Order HFACS-ME Classifications By Mishap Type
TOTAL FM FRM AGM
Supervisory Conditions 68 84% 1% 15%
Maintainer Conditions 7 57% 0% 43%
Working Conditions NA NA NA
Maintainer Acts 52 75% 2% 23%
D. SUMMARY
The prototype MEDART application has shown that such a tool can be invaluable
in providing the both the novice and intermediate computer users with a powerful
instrument for the reporting and analysis of MRMs. These users can readily generate the
myriad of reports and displays required to gain a sufficient appreciation of the trends and
associations within mishap data. While the prototype version of this software has its
limitations, it is anticipated that a commercially-developed working version would offer a
greater degree of flexibility and usability to aviation maintenance-related safety
personnel.
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APPENDIX D. MONTHLY SUMMARY OF MRMS BY TYPE AND CLASS FOR
FY90-FY99
Table Dl. Flight MRMs by FY.
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Total
October 1 3 5 1 2 1 4 1 18
November 2 5 1 1 2 1 1 3 16
December 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 10
January 5 9 2 2 4 2 1 2 1 28
February 3 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 13
March 6 1 3 2 2 4 2 1 3 4 28
April 2 3 4 3 1 4 1 18
May 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 19
June 4 2 4 4 5 1 1 1 2 1 25
July 1 6 1 1 3 2 2 2 18
August 2 7 1 4 2 2 1 5 4 28
September 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 11
Total 30 40 23 24 27 15 15 15 26 17 232
Table D2. Flight-Related MRMs by FY.
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Total
October 1 1 2 1 5
November 1 2 1 4
December 2 1 1 4
January 2 1 1 1 5
February 1 1 1 3
March 3 1 2 6
April 1 1 2
May 1 1 1 3
June 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
July 1 1 2
August 1 1 1 3
September 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Total 10 9 8 4 6 1 4 2 3 4 51
61
Table D3. Aircraft-Ground MRMs by FY.
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Total
October 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 1 28
November 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 18
December 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 20
January 4 4 5 3 5 3 4 1 1 30
February 5 2 1 4 4 4 3 3 26
March 4 4 6 3 2 4 2 1 5 31
April 1 3 1 2 3 2 3 2 2 19
May 5 4 7 1 2 2 2 3 1 27
June 3 2 1 6 6 3 2 4 2 29
July 4 6 6 7 5 2 2 1 3 3 39
August 3 7 2 4 1 1 1 1 5 25
September 3 4 3 5 1 2 1 1 2 2 24
Total 40 45 41 42 36 27 21 20 24 20 316
Table D4. Class A MRMs by FY.
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Total
October 2 2 1 1 2 1 9
November 2 1 1 1 1 1 7
December 1 2 3
January 3 2 2 1 8
February 1 1
March 1 2 2 1 1 7
April 1 1 1 3 2 8
May 1 1 1 1 1 5
June 3 1 2 1 1 8
July 3 2 2 1 1 9
August 1 2 1 1 1 1 7
September 1 1 2
Total 13 11 10 10 5 5 4 4 7 5 74
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Table D5. Class B MRMs bv FY.
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Total
October 1 1 1 1 1 5
November 1 2 1 4
December 1 1 2 4
January 1 1 1 2 5
February 1 1 1 3
March 1 2 1 1 1 6
April 2 2 1 1 1 7
May 2 2 1 6
June 1 1 1 1 1 6
July 2 1 4
August 3 1 2 1 1 9
September 2 1 1 1 1 7
Total 7 14 7 6 4 7 4 8 5 4 66
Table D6. Class C MRMs by FY.
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Total
October 4 4 3 7 6 4 3 4 1 1 37
November 3 7 5 5 1 2 3 1 27
December 2 4 2 6 2 3 1 1 3 3 27
January 6 12 5 5 9 3 4 3 1 2 50
February 8 4 2 5 5 7 3 3 1 38
March 12 5 8 3 5 5 4 1 2 7 52
April 2 4 4 2 4 1 3 2 2 24
May 6 3 9 3 3 4 3 3 3 1 38
June 5 4 5 8 9 4 2 2 7 2 48
July 4 9 6 6 6 2 2 3 3 5 46
August 4 9 2 3 4 2 3 1 8 4 40
September 4 4 4 6 2 2 1 1 5 3 32
Total 60 69 55 54 60 31 32 25 41 32 459
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# drr . func : Do the "double-root" chi-squared test on the object in
# "obj", the glm. Written by S.E. Buttrey.
#
# First extract the y's. Then get the predicted lambdas from predict ()
#
y <- obj$y
lambda <- predict (obj, type = "response") #
#
# Compute the "double roots".
#
drr <- sqrt(y) + sqrt (y +1) - sqrt(4 * lambda +1) #
#
# Under the null hypothesis, these things are roughly Normal, which
# means the sum of their squares is roughly Chi-squared, with df = n-2




p.val <- 1 - pchisq(sum(drr~2 ) , df = length(y) - 2)
return (c (stat = stat, p. value = p.val, df = length(y) - 2))
}
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APPENDIX F. FITTED VARIABLE POISSON PROCESS MODELS FOR MRM
TYPE AND CLASS FOR THE PERIOD FY90 - FY99
<& & <£> <£ o>N o>N q>N # fr $> <§> & <£> of" of" of <£> <£> cp & $> # <£ o> s£ <£> ©?> & $ o?
Month
Flight Mishaps Log(Y)=1.014+(-0.006*X)
Figure Fl. Variable Poisson Process Model for Flight MRMs.
<£ <£> <£ <£ q>v q,N °>N # & & & & & & & & & & 4> & & <£> £ £ $ & & # <£ <£
Month
Flight-Related Mishaps -°-Log(Y)=-0.151+(-0.013*X)
Figure F2. Variable Poisson Process Model for Flight-Related MRMs.
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Month
-•—Aircraft-Ground Mishaps -o- Log(Y)=1 .41 0+(-0.008*X)
Figure F3. Variable Poisson Process Model for Aircraft-Ground MRMs.
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Class B Mishaps -°-Log(Y)=-0.245+(-0.006*X)
Figure F5. Variable Poisson Process Model for Class B MRMs.
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Class C Mishaps Log(Y)=1.762+(-0.009*X)
Figure F6. Variable Poisson Process Model for Class C MRMs.
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APPENDIX G. PROBABILITY TABLES FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF MRMS
FOR FYOO
Table Gl. Flight MRM Probability Table for FYOO.
I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
October 1.29 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
November 1.29 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
December 1.28 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 1.27 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
February 1.26 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
March 1.25 0.29 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
April 1.25 0.29 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
May 1.24 0.29 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
June 1.23 0.29 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
July 1.22 0.30 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
August 1.22 0.30 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
September 1.21 0.30 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G2. Flight-Related MRM Probability Table for FYOO.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
October 0.17 0.84 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
November 0.17 0.84 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
December 0.17 0.84 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 0.16 0.85 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
February 0.16 0.85 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
March 0.16 0.85 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
April 0.16 0.85 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
May 0.15 0.86 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
June 0.15 0.86 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
July 0.15 0.86 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
August 0.15 0.86 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
September 0.15 0.86 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table G3. Aircraft-Ground MRM Probability Table for FYOO.
I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
October 1.57 0.21 0.33 0.26 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
November 1.56 0.21 0.33 0.26 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
December 1.55 0.21 0.33 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 1.54 0.21 0.33 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
February 1.52 0.22 0.33 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
March 1.51 0.22 0.33 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
April 1.50 0.22 0.33 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
May 1.49 0.23 0.34 0.25 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
June 1.48 0.23 0.34 0.25 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
July 1.46 0.23 0.34 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
August 1.45 0.23 0.34 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
September 1.44 0.24 0.34 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G4. Class A MRM Probability Table for FYOO.
A, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
October 0.31 0.73 0.23 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
November 0.31 0.74 0.22 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
December 0.30 0.74 0.22 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 0.30 0.74 0.22 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
February 0.30 0.74 0.22 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
March 0.29 0.75 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
April 0.29 0.75 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
May 0.29 0.75 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
June 0.28 0.75 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
July 0.28 0.76 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
August 0.28 0.76 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
September 0.28 0.76 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table G5. Class B MRM Probability Table for FYOO.
I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
October 0.37 0.69 0.25 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
November 0.37 0.69 0.25 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
December 0.37 0.69 0.25 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 0.36 0.70 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
February 0.36 0.70 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
March 0.36 0.70 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
April 0.36 0.70 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
May 0.35 0.70 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
June 0.35 0.70 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
July 0.35 0.71 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
August 0.35 0.71 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
September 0.34 0.71 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G6. Class C MRM Probability Table for FYOO.
X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
October 2.35 0.10 0.22 0.26 0.21 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
November 2.33 0.10 0.23 0.26 0.21 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
December 2.31 0.10 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 2.30 0.10 0.23 0.27 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
February 2.28 0.10 0.23 0.27 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
March 2.26 0.10 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
April 2.25 0.11 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
May 2.23 0.11 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
June 2.21 0.11 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
July 2.20 0.11 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
August 2.18 0.11 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
September 2.16 0.12 0.25 0.27 0.19 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
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